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MEMORANDUM FOR THE DDI  
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CIA SIGINT Officer


SUBJECT : Intelligence Contingency Planning for  
the Vietnam Theater

REFERENCE: USIB-D-64.6/47 (CCPC-D-27/68), 25 October 1968

1. The USIB reviewed on 31 October 1968 the CCPC Study on Intelligence Contingency Planning for the Vietnam Theater and approved it for forwarding to the Secretary of Defense for his comments and recommendations.
2. The USIB took the further action of stressing the immediate need for a more intense focus of effort on those intelligence targets which the CCPC has selected as being most sensitive under a bombing halt situation.
3. While this action is applicable primarily to the Clandestine Services in view of its accent on collection, I wish this drawn to the attention of those CIA personnel concerned with any aspect of intelligence on Vietnam.

/S/ Rufus Taylor

Rufus L. Taylor  
Vice Admiral, U.S. Navy  
Deputy Director



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UNITED STATES INTELLIGENCE BOARD

MEMORANDUM FOR HOLDERS OF USIB-D-64.6/47 *ccpc*

SUBJECT : Intelligence Contingency Planning for the  
Vietnam Theater

REFERENCE : USIB-D-64.6/47 (CCPC-D-27/68),  
25 October 1968

1. The Acting Chairman in restricted session at the 31 October USIB meeting opened the discussion by commenting that the CCPC paper was a very good one and then asked General Reynolds to proceed. General Reynolds began with a very brief review of the structure of the CCPC Study. He noted that Plan B for intelligence actions required under a cease fire in Vietnam is still in preparation by the CCPC. General Reynolds said that as far as the Study, including Plan A, was concerned there appeared to be general agreement and he knew of no specific proposals for change.

2. Mr. Hughes noted that the Department of State was concerned with, and will want to review and approve, the political risks of operating in areas adjacent to South Vietnam.

3. General Carter said that he considered that the CCPC Study was a good one and he had no problems with Plan A. He indicated, however, that he was concerned in connection with Plan B with the possibility of a phase down of the intelligence effort as well as the effect Plan B might have on the concept of intelligence operations elsewhere in Southeast Asia and the Pacific.

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4. General Carter went on to say that he was encouraged by the CCPC Study in that it recognizes the need for phasing the reduction of U. S. presence in the area to permit the continuation of essential intelligence activities. He noted that in the event of a cease fire, international and domestic pressures to withdraw U. S. forces of all kinds will be enormous. He felt therefore that Plan B must recognize the possibility that the timing of our withdrawal may not be ours to manage, and should give the same sense of importance to essential intelligence activities elsewhere in Southeast Asia and in the Pacific. He stressed that we must maintain a flexible and effective intelligence response in that area.

5. General Carter noted the sensitivity of the Study and expressed concern for its proper handling. Admiral Taylor said that he shared General Carter's concern on this point. Admiral Taylor noted that the report had been given a limited distribution but this had to take into account the need for adequate staffing of this Study. Admiral Taylor also said he wished to insure that the minutes reflect the previous remarks made by General Carter.

6. General McChristian said that the report is a very fine compendium of on-going actions and things that should be done. He also stated that he concurred with General Carter in his concern for the problems to be covered in Plan B. [REDACTED]

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[REDACTED] He also suggested that it would be more helpful to MACV if, at the beginning of paragraph 2, page 6, the most important Essential Elements of Information during a bombing halt were stated as:

"a. What is the quality and quantity of enemy manpower in-country and out of country? What are the changes in their status?"

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" b. What is the status of the communists infrastructure in South Vietnam? What are the trends; expansion and improvement, or reduction?"

7. General Reynolds explained that in II. A. on the preceding page 5 of the Study the CCPC had attempted to define the problem in somewhat the same manner but he had no objection to putting this thought in Plan A as proposed. The Board then accepted the addition to paragraph 2, page 6, suggested by General McChristian.\*

8. Several members of the Board participated in a discussion of an Army proposal that an explanatory footnote be inserted on page 8, paragraph 3. The proposed footnote was to state "It is recognized that the responsible agencies designated in this section of the plan may require revision when reviewed by the military authorities in DoD". General Reynolds said that information as to the responsible agencies in DoD was being checked with the Joint Staff. General Reynolds also noted the recommendation that the Study be sent to the Secretary of Defense for coordination and comment. General Carroll said that the designations looked all right to him but, if they are not right, any changes could be made in connection with DoD staffing during coordination by the Secretary of Defense. General Thomas pointed out some apparent errors in aircraft count and in wording on performance of drones in Appendix II. Admiral Taylor suggested that these points could also be handled during the DoD review.

9. After further discussion, Admiral Taylor read the draft memorandum which had been prepared for the DCI to transmit the CCPC Study to the Secretary of Defense for coordination. Several suggested changes were made including the addition of wording pointing out the sensitivity of the information in the Study. General McChristian withdrew his previous proposal for a footnote in light of the draft letter of transmittal to the Secretary of Defense.

\*Revised pages 6, 7, and 8 reflecting this agreed change of text are attached for substitution in copies of USIB-D-64.6/47.

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10. General Reynolds referred to paragraph 3 in the letter forwarding the report to the Secretary of Defense in which the DCI stated that he was taking action within CIA and the USIB to stress the need for a more intense focus of effort on those intelligence targets which the CCPC has selected as being most sensitive under a bombing halt situation. General Reynolds suggested that the Board should take cognizance of this and that the record should so reflect. Admiral Taylor asked that this be done.

11. In summary the USIB:

a. Reviewed the CCPC Study in USIB-D-64.6/47 and concurred in the recommendation by General Reynolds that the proposed plan as amended at this meeting be forwarded to the Secretary of Defense for coordination and comment.


b. Noted the proposed memorandum to the Secretary of Defense from the Director of Central Intelligence forwarding the Study for comments and recommendations prior to forwarding it to Mr. Rostow.

c. Noted the statement by the Director of Central Intelligence that, in view of the possible imminence of a bombing halt, action should be taken within CIA and the USIB to stress the need for a more intense focus of effort on those intelligence targets which the CCPC has selected as being most sensitive under a bombing halt situation.

d. Agreed that the sensitivity of the information in the CCPC Study should be emphasized to all holders thereof.

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### III. PLANS

Two separate intelligence contingency plans are being developed. The first, Plan A, which concerns the special efforts required under a bombing halt, is included here. The second, Plan B, concerns the special efforts required under a cease fire. This plan will be published separately when completed.

Descriptions of the various specific techniques and operations referred to in the plans will be found in Appendix II (Current Collection Capabilities) and Appendix III (New Systems).

#### A. PLAN A - Bombing Halt

##### 1. Purpose:

The purpose of this plan is to outline the special attention which will be required on intelligence collection in the event of a halt of the bombing against North Vietnam.

It is recognized that plans are extant or in process of development by the various levels of military command and by other agencies and departments concerned which encompass the several aspects of the special information needs associated with a bombing halt. The intent of this plan is not to cause the development of new and different plans where they are already adequately developed but rather to provide a comprehensive statement of those special information needs, the actions that appear necessary to fulfill them and a listing of the responsible agencies so that efforts required will be more fully coordinated and complementary.

##### 2. Primary Intelligence Targets and Essential Elements of Information Connected with the War in Vietnam

a. The most important questions to be answered during a bombing halt are:

(1) What is the quality and quantity of enemy manpower in-country and out of country? What are the changes in their status?

(2) What is the status of the Communist infrastructure in South Vietnam? What are the trends: expansion and improvement, or reduction?

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b. The specific collection requirements for information which would answer the questions in paragraph (a) above as well as full intelligence needs under both a bombing halt and a cease fire are contained in Appendix I. The general targets which must be covered to enable fulfillment of these requirements are:

- (1) Enemy activities in the DMZ
- (2) NVA troop activities in the panhandle north of the DMZ
- (3) Enemy troop concentrations and activities in South Vietnam, Cambodia, and Laos
- (4) Movement on infiltration routes (personnel and supplies) in Laos and Cambodia, and by maritime routes
- (5) Structure and activities of enemy paramilitary and other subversive organizations in South Vietnam
  - (a) Major cities
  - (b) Countryside
- (6) North Vietnamese Government
  - (a) Plans and intentions with respect to SVN
  - (b) Activities with respect to continued opposition to government of South Vietnam including support to the NLF, COSVN, and Party
  - (c) Support by other countries
- (7) North Vietnam
  - (a) Progress in reestablishing or exceeding their limited former industrial capacity

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- (b) Levels, types, and sources of imports
- (c) Military establishment and deployments
- (8) Government of South Vietnam
  - (a) Stability
  - (b) Policy and attitudes toward U.S.
  - (c) Ability to maintain internal security

c. It is expected that under a bombing halt not directly related to a general cease fire the enemy will continue efforts to improve his position in South Vietnam and that the engagement of combat forces will continue with the normal intelligence efforts being required to provide adequate intelligence to support our own and allied forces in their combat activities. For these reasons, as well as others, the following targets, of those listed above, will require special attention to ensure that our forces are not confronted by a surprise enemy build-up and to detect other unfavorable action by the enemy in response to the bombing halt: (1), (2), (3)(b), and (c), and (4). (Not all resources are covered in the following paragraphs, but only those which must be increased or diverted in part from current missions.)

3. Nature of special actions required and the responsible agencies:

a. Enemy activities in the DMZ

The DMZ, under a bombing halt, would require special attention since it is through this area that the enemy could move large forces with little warning time into positions which would threaten U.S. and allied positions. The intelligence problem is to be able to keep track of enemy movements there. The following actions should be taken to give increased emphasis to collection on this area.

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